Abstract. We study stopping games in the setup of Neveu. We prove the existence of a uniform value (in a sense defined below), by allowing the players to use randomized strategies. In constrast with previous work, we make no comparison assumption on the payoff processes. Moreover, we prove that the value is the limit of discounted values, and we construct -optimal strategies.
Introduction
introduced the following optimization problem. Two players observe stochastic sequences (r(n), x(n)) n . Player 1 (resp. player 2) is allowed to stop whenever x(n) ≤ 0 (resp. x(n) > 0). The two players choose stopping times µ 1 and µ 2 which obey this rule, and the payoff is given by There is a broad literature on continuous time Dynkin games giving sufficient conditions for the existence of the value and optimal strategies: Bismut (1979) proved that under the hypothesis a n = c n ≤ b n , some regularity assumption and Mokobodski's hypothesis (namely that there exist positive bounded supermartingales z and z satisfying a ≤ z − z ≤ b) the value exists. The regularity assumption was weakened by Alario-Nazaret, Lepeltier and Marchal (1982) , and then Lepeltier and Maingueneau (1984) established the existence of the value and optimal strategies without Mokobodski's hypothesis, assuming only a n = c n ≤ b n .
In the present paper, we focus on discrete time Dynkin games and we allow the players to use randomized stopping times. We prove the existence of the value, under the single integrability condition.
This result is related to a result due to Maitra and Sudderth (1993) , for general stochastic games. In such games, the players receive a payoff in each stage. Maitra and Sudderth define the payoff associated to a play as the lim sup of the payoffs received along the play. They prove that such games have a value, provided the payoffs are bounded and deterministic functions of the state.
It is clear that, under some regularity assumptions on the processes (a n ), (b n ) and (c n ), stopping games may be viewed as general stochastic games with a very specific transition structure (note however that boundedness of the payoff function will not be satisfied). Thus, the result of Maitra and Sudderth has some bite in stopping games. We emphasize that our method bears no relation to their approach (which is based on transfinite induction).
Our contribution is threefold. (i) We prove that the value exists under the single integrability requirement, and, moreover, it is uniform in a sense defined below. (ii) We prove that the value is the limit of the so-called discounted values, studied by Yasuda (1985) . In particular, it follows that the discounted values converge. (iii) We construct -optimal strategies for the players.
Our method is to construct a strategy for player 1 that guarantees him an expected payoff which is, up to an , the limit of some sequence of discounted values. We provide two different constructions for an -optimal strategy. In the first construction the player plays at each stage an optimal discounted strategy, where the discount factor may change from time to time. In the second construction, which has the flavor of Dynkin's construction, the player plays almost the limit of the optimal discounted strategies.
The paper is arranged as follows. In section 2 we present the model and the main results, in section 3 we introduce few tools, in section 4 we explain the main ideas of the two constructions, and finally, in sections 5.2 and 5.3 we provide the two constructions of -optimal strategies. Section 6 concludes the paper by discussing related issues.
The model and the main results
Let ( , A, P) be a probability space, and (F n ) be a filtration over ( , A, P) (the information available at stage n). Let (a n ), (b n ), (c n ) be processes, defined over ( , A, P). We assume
We also assume that (a n ), (b n ), and (c n ) are adapted. This assumption can be dispensed with. One needs only replace everywhere (a n ), (b n ), and (c n ) by their conditional expectations given F n . It is also convenient to assume A = σ (F n , n ≥ 0). By properly enlarging the probability space ( , A, P), one can assume w.l.o.g. that it supports a double sequence (X n , Y n ) ∞ n=0 of iid variables, uniformly distributed over [0, 1] , such that, for each n:
is F n+1 -measurable, and independent of F n .
Define the stopping game as follows. A strategy for player 1 (resp. player 2) is a [0, 1]-valued, adapted process x = (x n ) (resp. y = (y n )): x n is the probability that player 1 stops at stage n, conditional on stopping occurs after n − 1. The interpretation of a strategy as a randomized stopping time will be discussed in Section 6.
Given strategies (x, y), define the stopping stages of players 1 and 2 by t 1 = inf{n ≥ 0, X n ≤ x n }, t 2 = inf{n ≥ 0, Y n ≤ y n }, and set
Notice that t + 1 is a stopping time, but t needs not be. We set r(x, y) = a t 1 
The payoff of the game is γ (x, y) = E(r(x, y)). The goal of player 1 is to maximize γ (x, y), and the goal of player 2 is to minimize it. Definition 2.1. v ∈ R is the value of the game if v = sup x inf y γ (x, y) = inf y sup x γ (x, y). Let > 0. A strategy x that satisfies inf y γ (x, y) ≥ v − is an -optimal strategy for player 1. A strategy y that satisfies sup x γ (x, y) ≤ v + is an -optimal strategy for player 2.
We will establish the following:
Theorem 2.2. Every zero-sum stopping game that satisfies (1) has a value v.
Let λ ∈]0, 1[. Define the λ-discounted payoff by r λ (x, y) = (1 − λ) t+1 r(x, y) and γ λ (x, y) = E(r λ (x, y)).
Definition 2.3. v λ is the λ-discounted value of the game if
v λ = sup x inf y γ λ (x, y) = inf y sup x γ λ (x, y). Yasuda (1985) proves that the λ-discounted value always exists. In the sequel we prove that In particular, lim λ→0 v λ exists. Set γ n (x, y) = E( n−t n r(x, y)1 t<n ). The natural interpretation of γ n (x, y) is in terms of average payoffs: for k ∈ N, set g k = r(x, y) on {t < k} and g k = 0 otherwise. Then γ n (x, y) = E(
By dominated convergence, lim n γ n (x, y) = γ (x, y). Therefore, if x * is an -optimal strategy of player 1, then for every y there exists a stage N such that γ n (x * , y) ≥ v − 2 holds for every n ≥ N .
We prove that the value v is uniform in the sense below. Thus, Theorem 2.5 is a strengthening of Theorem 2.2. It can be shown that it also implies Theorem 2.4. We then say that v is the uniform value of the game. Theorem 2.5 was proved by Mertens and Neyman (1981) for general stochastic games with bounded payoffs, in which the function λ → v λ satisfies some bounded variation property. In the case of recursive games with bounded payoffs, Rosenberg and Vieille (2000) proved that Theorem 2.5 holds, if (v λ ) converge uniformly as λ goes to 0 (the uniformity is with respect to the initial state of the game). Our proof does not require any conditions on the discounted values.
Local games

Reminder and definitions
Let g : A × B → R, where A and B are finite sets (g is the payoff function of a zero-sum matrix game with action sets A and B). Denote by (A) and (B) the sets of probability distributions over A and B, and still by g the bilinear extension of g to (A) × (B).
The min max theorem states that sup
which we denote by val g. Any x (resp. y) which achieves the sup on the left side (resp. inf on the right side) is called an optimal strategy of player 1 (resp. player 2). It is well known that the operator val is non-decreasing and non-expansive:
For any real-valued F n -measurable function f , we let G n (f ) be the 0-sum game with (F n -measurable) payoff matrix f b n a n c n in which player 1 chooses a row and player 2 a column.
A strategy of player 1 in this game is a [0, 1]-valued, F n -measurable variable x n , to be interpreted as the probability that player 1 chooses the bottom row. A strategy of player 2 is defined analogously.
Define G n (x n , y n ; f ) to be the (F n -measurable) payoff to player 1 when the players use strategies x n and y n :
By the min max theorem, for every ω ∈ the game with payoff matrix
has a value, denoted by val G n (f )(ω), for every ω ∈ .
We now argue that each player has an optimal strategy in G n (f ). Proof. For every ω ∈ , the game with payoff matrix
has optimal strategies for both players. Since f, a n , b n and c n are all F n -measurable, the map which associates to each ω the set of optimal strategies for player 1 is upper-semi-continuous and F n -measurable. By Kuratowski and Ryll-Nardzewski (1965) it has an F n -measurable selection.
Any x n that satisfies the conclusion of Proposition 3.1 is said to be optimal in the game G n (f ). If x n and y n are optimal strategies in G n (f ), one has G n (x n , y n ;
Local games and discounted values
It is useful to extend the notions of discounted values to the game starting at stage n.
For n ∈ N, set n = {x, x p = 0, ∀p < n}, and T n = {y, y p = 0, ∀p < n}. Those are strategies where the probability that the players stop before stage n is zero. Set
and
The proposition below contains obvious properties.
Yasuda (1985) proves that (v n (λ)) n and (v n (λ)) n are both solutions of the recursive equation
He then proves that any solution of this sequence of equations is at most (v n (λ)) and at least (v n (λ)). Since v n (λ) ≥ v n (λ) it follows that the two are equal, P-a.s.
We give a shorter argument, adapted from Shapley (1953) . Since the value operator is non-expansive,
By taking expectations, one obtains
to be the λ-discounted value of the game starting at stage n.
We now let (λ p ) p be any decreasing sequence which converges to 0. Set v n = lim sup p→∞ v n (λ p ), and w = E[v 0 ]. We shall prove the next proposition. We now explain why Proposition 3.3 implies Theorem 2.5 -w is the value of the game. Define z 0 = lim inf p→∞ v 0 (λ p ), and z = E[z 0 ]. By symmetry, for each , there exists a strategy y such that γ n (x, y) ≤ z + for each x, provided n is large enough. This readily implies w − ≤ z + . Since z ≤ w, and is arbitrary, one obtains w = z. This shows that w is the uniform value of the game. The claim about the limit of discounted values is now immediate, since the sequence (λ p ) used to define w is arbitrary.
The following result will be used later.
Proposition 3.4. One has
. By monotonicity of the value operator,
where α q = 1 −λ q if the val is negative, and 1 otherwise. By dominated conver-
Since the val operator is non-expansive, the right-hand side of (4) converges to val G n (E[v n+1 |F n ]), P-a.s. The result follows.
Locally optimal strategies and martingale properties
Denote by x n (λ) and by x * n optimal strategies of player 1 in the local games
, which exist by Proposition 3.1.
Thus, for every strategy y and every n ≥ 0, one has
Recall that v n (λ) is to be interpreted as the value of the (discounted) game starting in stage n, conditional on the fact that the game has not been stopped. Define the strategies x(λ) = (x n (λ)) n and x * = (x * n ) n . Equation 3 and Proposition 3.4 provide recursive formulas for (v n ) n and (v n (λ)) n . In order to interpret these formulas in terms of submartingale properties, we use auxiliary processes.
For clarity of exposition, given any two events E and A in A, we say that E holds P-a.s. on A if P(A ∩ E c ) = 0. We will frequently omit the qualification P-a.s.
Let (α n ) n be an adapted integrable process on ( , A, (F n ), P), and s 1 ≤ s 2 two stopping times (with values in N∪{+∞}). We say that (α n ) n is a submartingale between s 1 and s 2 if, for every n ≥ 0, the inequality E[α n+1 |F n ] ≥ α n holds P-a.s. on the event {s 1 ≤ n < s 2 }. The process (α n ) n is a submartingale up to s 2 if it is a submartingale between 0 and s 2 . It is straightforward to adapt the sampling theorem as follows. Let (α n ) be a submartingale between s 1 and s 2 . Let s be a stopping time, with P-a.s. finite values, such that s ≤ s 2 . Denote by F s 1 the σ -algebra of events known at stage s 1 . Then one has E[α s |F s 1 ] ≥ α s 1 , P-a.s. on the event {s 1 ≤ s}.
Let (x, y) be a pair of strategies and t the induced stopping stage defined by (2). We define (α n ) asα n = α n on {t ≥ n} andα n = r(x, y) if t < n. The process (α n ) depends on (x, y). To avoid ambiguity, we will sometimes write: under (x, y), the process (α n ) etc, when we wish to emphasize which strategies are being used in the definition of (α n ). With a (convenient) abuse of terminology, we refer to (α n ) as the process (α n ) stopped at t.
We use repeatedly the following relation, which holds P-a.s. on the event {t ≥ n}:
if (X n , Y n ) is independent of α n+1 . This latter independence property holds in all cases of interest, for instance if α n+1 = v n+1 or α n+1 = v n+1 (λ), so that we shall apply (7) without further justification. Set F 2 n = σ (F n , Y n ), so that F 2 n includes past and present values of the payoff processes, past "decisions" of the players and the decision of player 2 at stage n.
Lemma 3.5. Let y be a strategy of player 2, and λ
Notice that sup n |ṽ n (λ)| and sup n |ṽ n | belong to L 1 (P), for every choice of (x, y).
Proof. Let n ≥ 0. On the event {t ≥ n},
which is at least v n (λ), by (6) . This proves the first claim sinceṽ
For a similar reason, using (5),
on the event {t ≥ n}. On {t < n},ṽ n+1 =ṽ n . The same computation works also for the filtration (F 2 n ) n . This completes the proof.
Proof. Fix a strategy y of player 2. Let n ≥ 0, and apply the submartingale property with the stopping time min(t + 1, n):
that is, using the definition of the stopped process (ṽ n ) n :
By dominated convergence, the left-hand side converges to γ λ (x(λ), y).
A similar proof proves the following.
Corollary 3.7.
Let n ∈ N. Letx(λ) be the strategy that is identically 0 until stage n, and coincides with x(λ) afterwards. Let y be any strategy of player 2 that is identically 0 until stage n. Then
Corollary 3.6 implies that in the discounted game it is an optimal strategy for player 1 to play x(λ). No such result holds for the original problem: playing x * needs not be an optimal strategy. Nevertheless, if t 1 is P-a.s. finite under x * , then x * is optimal for player 1.
Lemma 3.8. If P(t 1 < +∞) = 1 under x * , then x * guarantees w for player 1. Proof. Let y be an arbitrary strategy of player 2. By Lemma 3.5, (ṽ n ) is a submartingale under (x * , y). Since P(t 1 < +∞) = 1, P(t < +∞) = 1 as well, hence it follows that
as desired.
The main ideas of the proofs
We give a detailed sketch of the proofs in the deterministic case. Many technical issues disappear in that case. Therefore the main ideas appear, hopefully more clearly. Assume that (a n ) n , (b n ) n , (c n ) n , and therefore also (v n ) n and (v n (λ)) n , are sequences of real numbers, bounded by 1. For every y, (ṽ n ) n is a bounded submartingale under (x * , y), thus
withṽ ∞ = lim nṽn . For y = 0, (ṽ n ) coincides with v n up to t 1 . Thus, t 1 < +∞, P-a.s., or (v n ) n is a convergent sequence. In the first case, x * is optimal by (8) .
We now assume that (v n ) is a convergent sequence, and given ε > 0, we choose N 0 such that sup n,m≥N 0 |v n − v m | ≤ ε/2. We also assume for simplicity N 0 = 0 (in the general case, the strategies below would be supplemented by: play x * up to N 0 ). If w ≤ ε,ṽ ∞ ≤ 3ε/2 , so that x * is 3ε/2-optimal by (8) . We are thus led to consider the case w > ε.
First proof. Choose λ 0 such that v(λ 0 ) ≥ w − ε/3 and ε ∈ (0, ε/6). Player 1 starts playing according to x(λ 0 ). For each y, ((1 − λ 0 ) nṽ n (λ 0 )) n is a submartingale up to t. Set s 1 = inf{n, v n (λ 0 ) ≤ ε }. Since (ṽ n (λ 0 )) n is bounded, min(t, s 1 ) is P-a.s. finite. Moreover, since v s 1 (λ 0 ) ≤ v(λ 0 ) − (ε/6 − ε ) if s 1 ≤ t, the probability that t < s 1 is bounded away from 0.
At stage s 1 , the approximation of (v n ) by (v n (λ 0 )) n gets poor, so we switch to a new discount factor: λ 0 is replaced by λ 1 , with v s 1 (λ 1 ) ≥ v s 1 − ε/3 ≥ ε/6, and x(λ 1 ) is played until s 2 = inf{n > s 1 , v n (λ 1 ) ≤ ε }, where we again switch from λ 1 to λ 2 , and so on.
Call x the resulting strategy. Under (x, y), t is P-a.s. finite, since for every n, the probability of stopping between s n and s n+1 is bounded away from 0. Introduce the sequence (w n ) n , where w n = v n (λ p ) if s p ≤ n < s p+1 . By construction, w 0 ≥ v − ε/3 and (w n ) n is a submartingale. Since t < +∞, it converges to r(x, y)1 t<+∞ , therefore γ (x, y) ≥ w − ε/3.
Second proof. The definition of x here is motivated by the observation lim sup n a n ≥ w − ε (9) which is derived as follows. For each λ, under (x(λ), 0), t = t 1 and r(x(λ), 0) = a t if t < +∞; thus,
The left-hand side lies in the closed convex hull of {0, a n , n ∈ N}. Given any δ > 0, v(λ) ≥ w − δ, for a suitable λ. Therefore, sup n a n ≥ w − δ. Since v n ≥ w − ε for every n, this proof may be repeated, and (9) holds. We define x by x n = x * n + ε if a n ≥ w − 2ε, and x n = x * n otherwise. Since (9) holds, t 1 < +∞ P-a.s. under x. To see that this strategy guarantees player 1 an expected payoff of w, we note that the following points hold:
1. If player 2 stops the game (t = t 2 ), then the expected payoff of player 1 is at least w (up to an ). 2. In the case that player 2 always continues, since player 1 changes his strategy only when a unilateral stopping is favorable for him, E [v n ] ≥ w − .
Two -optimal strategies
Preliminaries
For the rest of the section we fix > 0. Set m = sup n (sup(|a n |, |b n |, |c n |)). Since m ∈ L 1 (P), there exists η > 0 such that, for every A ∈ A,
Notice that |v n (λ)| , |v n | ≤ E[m | F n ], P-a.s. for every n. The sequence (v n ) needs not converge. On the other hand, the process (ṽ n ), being a submartingale under (x * , y) (with supṽ n ∈ L 1 (P)) converges P-a.s. and in L 1 (P), for every y.
The stopping time t 1 is a function of player 1's strategy. Under (x * , 0), t = t 1 , P-a.s. This implies that (v n ) converges P-a.s. on the set {t 1 = +∞}.
Choose N 0 ∈ N such that
Thus, after stage N 0 , with high probability v n does not change by much. 
An -optimal strategy for player 1 -I
We shall prove that x is 7ε-optimal. By Lemma 3.5, for every y, (ṽ n ) n is a submartingale up to s 0 , and ((1 − λ p ) nṽ n (λ p )) n is a submartingale between min(s p , t + 1) and min(s p+1 , t + 1), for each p.
We introduce an auxiliary variable z n defined as
Intuitively, z n is (up to /3), the parameter we are interested in: the limit v n before stage s 0 , and the λ p -discounted value for s p ≤ n < s p+1 . We ultimately wish to get a submartingale. A minor adjustment is needed. Define the stopping time s by s = +∞ if s 0 = +∞ and s = inf{n ≥ N 0 , v n ≤ ε/2} otherwise. By the definition of N 0 , P(s < +∞, t 1 ≥ N 0 ) < η. We use s to define a process (w n ) by
Indeed, this is clear if s ≤ n + 1 or if t < n + 1. If not :
If n + 1 < s p+1 , thenw n+1 =ṽ n+1 (λ p ), while if n + 1 = s p+1 ,
We set t + 1 = min(t + 1, s). Observe that P(t = t) ≥ 1 − η.
Lemma 5.1. For every y, (w n ) is a submartingale up to t + 1 under (x, y).
Proof. Fix a strategy y of player 2. Let n ∈ N. We prove that E[w n+1 |F n ] ≥w n , P-a.s. on the event {t + 1 > n}. If n < s 0 , w n = v n − /3, w n+1 ≥ v n+1 − /3 (with equality if n+1 < s 0 ), and
, where the second inequality follows from the inequality G n (x * n , y n ; E[v n+1 |F n ]) ≥ v n and since the val operator is non-expansive.
If s p ≤ n < s p+1 , w n = v n (λ p ), and x n = x n (λ p ). In that case, by (12),
where the last inequality holds since v n (λ p ) > 0.
Lemma 5.2. For every y, under (x, y), t < +∞, P-a.s. on the event s
Proof. Fix a strategy y of player 2. We proceed in two steps. We prove first that min(s p+1 , t) < +∞, P-a.s. on {s p < s}. From min(s p , t+1) up to min(s p+1 , t+1),
is a submartingale. Thus, for every N ∈ N and n ≤ N , the sampling property applied to the finite stopping time min(s p+1 , t + 1, N) yields
By taking N → +∞ and by dominated convergence for conditional expectations, one obtains
on the event {s p ≤ n < min(s p+1 , t + 1)}. By taking the limit n → ∞ in (13), one gets lim sup w n ≤ 0, P-a.s. on the event {s p < +∞, t = s p+1 = +∞} ∩ {s p < s}. But on this event w n ≥ ε , P-a.s. for every n. This ends the first step.
One can rephrase the conclusion of the first step as min(s p+1 , t) < +∞ if min(s p , t) < +∞, P-a.s. By induction, min(s p , t) < +∞ if s 0 < +∞, P-a.s. for every p.
Since (ṽ n (λ p )) n is a submartingale between min(s p , t +1) and min(s p+1 , t +1), and since v s p+1 (λ p 
, it follows by taking expectations that 6 P(s p < t + 1) ≤ E(m1 s p <t+1<+∞ ) + ε P(s p+1 <t + 1),
As p goes to infinity, the left-hand side converges to ( /6 − ε )P(s 0 = N 0 , t = +∞), while the right-hand side converges to 0. The result follows. 
This readily implies that (14) holds under (x, y), for every y. Let now N 2 be sufficiently large such that
Using (14), (10) and (15) we have:
Fix n ≥ N 2 and any strategy y.
By definition, γ n+1 (x, y)
but this event has a probability at most 2η. Consider now the event {t ≥ N 1 , s 0 = +∞}. The event {t ≥ N 1 , s 0 = +∞, sup q≥N 1 v q > 3ε/2} has probability at most η. On the event {t ≥ N 1 ,
where the second inequality uses the fact that {t ≥ N 1 , s 0 = +∞} ∈ F N 1 , and the submartingale property of (w n ) n .
Thus,
where the second inequality uses w = E [w 0 ] and the submartingale property of (w n ) n . The result follows from (16).
An -optimal strategy for player 1 -II
By Lemma 3.8, if P(t 1 < +∞) = 1 under x * , then x * guarantees w for player 1. Therefore, we assume from now on that under x * P(t 1 < +∞) < 1.
Recall that ε > 0 is given, and that η > 0 is such that
Assume moreover that ηE[m] ≤ ε.
Recall also that N 0 is such that, under (x * , 0),
By (17) we can assume w.l.o.g. that N 0 is sufficiently large so that under x * ,
Define the strategyx bŷ
We will prove that γ (x, y) ≥ w−9ε, for every y. The stronger statement: γ n (x, y) ≥ v − 6ε, for every n ≥ N 1 and every y also holds, provided N 1 is large enough. We will not provide a proof. Proof. Let λ > 0 and q ∈ N be given. Denote byx(λ) the strategy that coincides with 0 for n < q, and with x(λ) for n ≥ q. From Corollary 3.7, under (x(λ), 0),
Since player 2 never stops, t = t 1 and r = a t 1 on t < +∞. Since (1 − λ) t+1−q ≤ 1, P-a.s., the left-hand side of (20) is at most
with a + n = max(a n , 0). Using (20),
By letting λ go to zero, one obtains E sup n≥q a + n |F q ≥ v q . The sequence (E sup n≥q a + n |F q ) q converges P-a.s. to lim sup q a + q . Therefore lim sup q a + q ≥ lim sup q v q . Thus, on the event {lim sup n v n > 0}, lim sup n a n ≥ lim sup n v n , as desired.
Proposition 5.5. Let y be given. One has E r(x, y)1 1 
under (x, y).
Proof. We explicit the idea that, if player 2 stops at stage n, the corresponding expected payoff (where the expectation is taken with respect to player 1's decision) is at least v n , up to ηm, since player 1 plays x * n up to η. Recall that F 2 n = σ (F n , Y n ), so that F 2 n includes past and present values of the payoff processes, past "decisions" of the players and the decision of player 2 at stage n. Observe that {t 2 = t = n} ∈ F 2 n , and that by assumption X n is independent of F 2 n . Therefore, on the event {t 2 = t = n},
(Note that the variable E v n+1 |F n is here irrelevant). Since x n is an optimal strategy in the local game G n (E v n+1 |F n ), by Lemma 3.4,
so that E r(x, y)|F 2 n ≥ v n − ηm on the event {t 2 = n = t}. In other words,
By first taking conditional expectations given F N 0 , and then summing over n ≥ N 0 , one obtains
which yields
Proposition 5.6. Let y be given. One has
Proof. Fix a strategy y. Note that 1 ∩ {t 1 < t 2 } = {N 0 ≤ t 1 < t 2 , v N 0 > }, and on this set, r(x, y) = a t 1 . By the definition of N 0 , Notice that θ = +∞ if θ > N 0 ; therefore (ṽ n ) converges, P-a.s. on the event {θ > N 0 }, say toṽ ∞ .
Given the integrability properties of (ṽ n ), one has
By definition of (ṽ n ), one hasṽ ∞ = r(x, y) if t < +∞,ṽ ∞ ≤ 3 /2 if t = +∞ and sup n,m≥N 0 |v n − v m | ≤ /2, andṽ ∞ ≤ m otherwise. Thus, by (18) and (19),
The inequality (22) may be rewritten as
and therefore, using Propositions 5.5 and 5.6, E(r(x, y)1 t<+∞ ) ≥ w − 17 2 , and the result follows.
Concluding remarks
This section contains a discussion of related issues. We first discuss an alternative way of introducing randomization into stopping games 1 . We then discuss a fairly easy extension of our main result.
We introduced randomization by allowing the players, at any stage, to stop with a probability between zero and one. These strategies are usually called behavior strategies in the game theory literature. We might as well consider the possibility for a player to select randomly a (deterministic) stopping time at the beginning of the game, thereby extending differently the set of available strategies. These strategies are called mixed strategies. For many classes of games, the two extensions are equivalent in a strong sense. The first equivalence result is due to Kuhn (1953) .
For stopping games (as for many other games), the definition of mixed strategies as suggested here is problematic, since it requires to define a convenient measurable structure on the set of stopping times. There are two ways to avoid this problem.
Following Aumann (1964) , one may enlarge the probability space from We claim that these mixed strategies are equivalent to behavioral strategies. Denote σ r = φ(r, ·). Then σ r is λ 1 -a.e. a stopping time. For each mixed strategy φ and every n ∈ N, define H (φ) n = 1 {σ r ≤n} λ 1 (dr) the probability under φ that player 1 stops prior to stage n + 1. Clearly, (H (φ) n ) is (F n )-adapted. It can be viewed as the (random) distribution function corresponding to some behavior strategy x, that we denote by h(φ). The map h from mixed to behavior strategies is onto. Indeed, given a behavior strategy x, denote by F x the distribution function of t 1 . Set φ x (r, ω) := inf{n ≥ 0, F x (n, ω) ≥ r}. Then φ x is a mixed strategy, such that h(φ x ) = x. It is easy to verify that, for each pair (φ, ψ) of mixed strategies, the expected payoff under (φ, ψ) coincides with the expected payoff under the pair (h(φ), h(ψ)) of behavior strategies. For more details, see Touzi and Vieille (1999) .
Another approach to define mixed strategies is due to Bismut (1977) : it consists of interpreting such a strategy as an element of the dual space of a Banach space containing the stopping times, and of using functional analysis methods.
We argue now that the first proof of the main result can be extended to handle a larger class of stochastic games. 2 The class of games we consider now is the following. Each player has finitely many actions. The sets of actions are respectively A and B for the two players. The two players choose repeatedly elements from A and B. n is the payoff that is received by player 1 in that case. The payoff is zero if the game never stops.
In words, those are games where the actions of the players may influence the probability of termination and the terminal payoff, but, if the game continues, they do not influence the information of the players at the next stage.
Clearly, stopping games belong to this class, with A = B = {stop, continue}, and p a,b n = 0 if a = b = continue, and p a,b n = 1 otherwise. To specify properly the game, we need to tell what is known at stage n about past choices of the players. This turns here to be irrelevant (in contrast with other classes of stochastic games).
We briefly sketch how the proof in Section 5.2 has to be adapted. All notations are the same. The only difficulty lies in defining N 0 , since, loosely speaking, there exists no least terminating strategy. Partition into c and d , where c ∈ A = F ∞ is the convergence set of the sequence (v n ) n , and d = \ c . We choose an integer N 0 large enough and an event F ∈ F N 0 such that P(F c ) < η. We define a strategyx that has the following features: it coincides with x * unless F occurs and v N 0 > ; in that case, it switches at stage N 0 to the strategy we defined in section 5.2, i.e., it plays a sequence of locally optimal strategies in properly chosen discounted games if v N 0 > ε.
It can be shown thatx guarantees w up to 7ε. It is not clear whether the second proof can be generalized to this class of games. We conclude with a brief discussion on our assumptions related to the filtration (F n ) n . We assumed that the payoff processes (a n ), (b n ) and (c n ) are adapted, and that X n and Y n are independent of F n but F n+1 -measurable. As we argued previously, the first assumption can be totally dispensed with. Informally, the second assumption means that (i) in any stage, each player has no information about the action the other player is about to choose, and (ii) past choices are observed. The first part of the assumption is crucial, but the second is irrelevant. Observe indeed that our ε-optimal strategies make no use of the past actions of the opponent. Finally, it is crucial that both players have the same filtration. The existence of the value does not extend to the situation where the payoff processes are constant, and one of the players has more information than the other about their value.
